The  Barometer / v.9-4 by Fremgen, J.M. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Institutional Publications Naval Postgraduate School Barometer
1972-04-24
The Barometer / v.9-4
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50177
YOLo IX, No. 4 
25 APR 72 
BAROMETIR 
WEEK OF 24 APRIL 1972 
EDITOR: 
LCDR THOMAS J. LOFTUS 
SMC 112034 
The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and information concerning the development and improvement of 
the professi~nal environment at NPS and within the U. S. Navy. 
OFFICERS, FACULTY, STAFF and WIVES 
are invited to contribute articles 
of interest to the BAROMETER 
c/o The Editor. 
EXCELLENCE IN BUREAUCRACY 
Ronald G. Shafer, "No Bureaucrat Wants Award of 'The Bird' Not Even Its Winners" 
NEW YORK TIMES 
WASHINGTON - Facing a big policy decision? Consider the principles of "creative 
bureaucracy" : 
"When in charge, ponder. When in trouble, delegate. When in doubt, mumble." Then 
refer the whole problem to a coordinating committee for review. 
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~-That's the advtce of no less an expert than James Boren, founder and chief finger-
tapper-l or the :N:At~l Association of Professional Bureaucrats. NATAPROBU (every self-
respecting w~ln~e~ group must have an acronym) is devoted to paper shufflers everywhere 
'who, by thei~t~~ast dedication to the principles of dynamic inactivism, have kept 
things £ro!ll h<§:pe~~ , and thereby prevented mis takes from being made." Its emb lem: a 
scrawny, . ird ~ra98~ng in red tape, initialed-memos and gobbledygook. . 
:i 0.. ~. 0 
Jim Boren, formerly a State Department official and now a Washington consultant, 
created NATAPROBU in 1968 as a vehicle for giving proper recognition to bureaucratic 
inaction. For a while all was well. But now NATAPROBU is perilously close to violating 
its own commitment to the status quo: Ominously, it is beginning to accomplish something. 
Veteran ponderers here blame this largely on the "Order of the Bird." This is an 
iiiWard, a metal statue of an "unfeathered, potbellied bird," presented by NATAPROBU to 
those exhibiting excellence in bureaucratic excess. The first winner was a regional 
Internal Revenue Service official, for his detailed memorandum outlining lengthy require-
ments for employee sideburns. Another recipient was a State Department analyst who wrote a 
foreign-policy paper on "the qualitative quantitive interface." 
The scheduled winner at NATAPROBU's 1969 awards banquet (delayed until December 1970 
by red tape), was Vice President Spiro Agnew, for his alliterative achievements in 
communications. But Mr. Agnew declined the honor, responding in a telegram that "in all 
meiotic modesty" there were others "possessing prolusionary processes more deserving." 
("Prolusionary" actually is Mr. Boren's word and apparently is his version of prolusory"; 
he admits to sometimes making up words as part of his philosophy of "adjustice responses".) 
At any rate, therein lies the problem. No one wants to get the bird. 
Last summer Mr. Boren was a star witness at hearings by a House Public Works sub-
committee into ways to reduce government red tape. Mr. Boren, however, staunchly defended 
the growing blizzard of paper and carbon copies. Indeed, the 46-year-old Oklahoman 
testified with his usual deadpan eloquence: 
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"To deny a dedicated finger-tapper an adequate supply of paper on which to record 
the results of his prodigious pondering is to deny him the tools of creative nonrespon-
siveness." ••• 
Mr. Boren's testimony may have included other insights. No one is sure, because he 
mumbled much of the time. Still, subcommittee members were obviously impressed. "I 
think it is one of the finest (statements) I have ever heard," responded Rep. John C. 
Kluczynski (D., Ill.), "but I don't know what in the hell he is talking about. I have 
been 41 years in the legislature and business, and I have never heard anything like this 
in all my life." 
Actually the Congressman's response was partly tongue-in-cheek. But only partly. 
"Boren's testimony was a welcome relief from the usual seriousness of congressional 
hearings, but he got his point across in a very effective way," says a subcommittee 
staffer. 
EDITOR"S NOTE: The preceding article was originally scheduled to be reprinted in January, 
but was delayed because of Bureaucratic Red Tape. 
The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lt. Col. William A. Hamilton, III, U. s. 
Army, Naval warcoilege Review, April, 1972) Conclusion. 
Having dwelt upon Presidents Kennedy and Johnson up to this point in our discussion 
of civil-military relations in the Government, we now turn to the role played by Robert S. 
McNamara who, as the eighth Secretary of Defense, served longer in this capacity than any 
other man in history. During his tenure the military power of the United States rose 
to its highest point since World War II while the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
sank to an all-time low. 
Mr. McNamara, prior to his brief stint in the military during World War II, spent 
most of his adult life in school either as a teacher or a student. After World War II 
he went to the Ford Motor Company and in 14 years worked his way up to the presidency. 
Although McNamara's energy, dedication, and methods were impressive enough to result 
in his selection as the first non-Ford-Family president in the history of the company, his 
reliance on numbers and measures sometimes led him astray • 
••• Many Ford men became dubious of the whole statistical analysis 
approach when the company halted production of an Edsel automobile. "It was 
killed," insisted one executive, "not because of its repulsive front grill or 
because we were slow building a strong sales team but because McNamara's 
charts showed there was no more market for a medium-priced car - something 
General Motors promptly disproved. "Those charts," the executive dryly noted, 
"give you funny answers sometimes." 
While Mr. McNamara was working his way to the top of the Ford Motor Company, a number 
of changes were being made in the Pentagon which would someday allow Mr. McNamara to 
dominate the JCS just as he had his staff at the Ford Motor Company. 
Paradoxically, the high-water mark of JCS influence occurred during World War II when 
the JCS did not officially exist. President Roosevelt reposed such trust and confidence 
in the Chiefs that " ••• he refused to issue a formal definition of JCS duties and functions I 
rn'guing that a written charter might hamper the Joint Chiefs of Staff in extending their 
activities as necessary to meet the requirements of the war." 
Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947, the role of the JCS began to be 
prescribed and circumscribed. As the threat posed by the expansionist policies of the 
Soviet Union grew, there were serious and honest disagreements among the armed services 
over the best method of containing the threat. This controversy was naturally reflected 
in the JCS as the Chiefs attempted to define the best military strategy. Fairly or 
unfairly, these deep concerns earned a bad image for the JCS, and it was said around 
Washington that" ••• The Congress debates, the Supreme"" Court deliberates but the Joint 
Chiefs bicker." In an effort to minimize the effect of this bickering on defense policy, 
the Congress and the Executive took a number of actions which greatly increased the 
authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over the service components. 
- . --' ... 
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In 1953 the JCS were taken out of the chain of command so that it ran from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense through the civilian service secretaries to the 
. commanders in the field. In 1958 the service secretaries were taken out of the chain of 
command. and the JCS were given operational responsibility for the unified and specified 
commands but were specifically forbidden any executive authority. The scope of the 
Chairman's duties was increased, giving him more influence over his fellow members, but 
at the same time a formal restraint was placed on easy communication between the JCS 
and the Congress. Free communication with the President was. of course, inhibited by the 
chain of command. 
By 1960 the stage was set for Robert McNamara. Seizing the initiative and armed with 
(the requisite legal authority and the unqualified backing of President Kennedy, Secretary 
~cNamara began to bring all activities in the Defense Department under his own control. 
Central to this effort was Mr. McNamara's conviction that. " ••• the direction of the 
Department of Defense demands not only a strong, responsible civilian control, but a 
Secretary's role that consists of active, imaginative and decisive leadership of the 
establishment at large, and not the passive practice of simply refereeing the disputes of 
traditional and partisan factions." 
The first step was to change the rules by which decisions about military strategy 
and procurement were made. To do this McNamara brought into his office a staff of systems 
analysts. McNamara and his staff felt that the generals and admirals relied too much on 
their judgment and experience as a basis for decisions. The generals and admirals felt 
that some things just could not be quantified and had to be decided on the basis of judg-
ment and experience. Over the McNamara years the battle centered on just where this fine 
line lay. 
The outcome of this struggle was vital to the future roles the generals and admirals 
were to play. For the systems analysts the contest was not as crucial. Systems analysis 
had proven itself to be a useful management tool, and its future was assured. The future 
was not so certain for senior military officers because if almost everything could be 
quantified and rationalized mathematically. then generals and admirals were simply anachro-
nisms in every regard except for holding command in the field. If intuitive judgment and 
professional experience were to be relegated to a minor role in the decisionmaking process, 
then general and flag officers are not needed anymore at the highest levels of the Defense 
Establishment because it is primarily for their judgment and experience that they hold 
positions in the defense staff. 
Traumatic as the McNamara experience was, it was certainly not without benefit to the 
military. " ••• Probably McNamara's most significant contribution to military strength," 
said one veteran, was that ''he forced the Services to ge t at the heart of their own basic 
logic on why they want things." 
It took the military services a while to adapt to the new rules in the Pentagon, and 
a number of new faces were brought in to cope with McNamara's "whiz kids." It was not long 
before each military service formed its own staff of systems analysts who were just as 
knowledgeable and bright as the ones from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
The benefit of subjecting service originated plans and proposals to systems analysis had 
~ecome obvious. At the same time the services learned that by using certain assumptions 
~ne could make the answer come out most any way that was desired. The manipulation of 
these assumptions became, in fact, the basis for the fundamental disagreement between OSD 
and the services. Reports of this practice on the part of OSD began to circulate, and 
McNamara's honeymoon with the ever-watchful Congress began to end. Nowhere was this and 
the struggle for existence by the generals and admirals more clearly demonstrated than in 
the controversy over the TFX. 
Both the Navy and the Air Force were badly in need of a new attack aircraft, a new 
air-superiority aircraft. a new interceptor, and new reconnaissance aircraft. It seemed 
logical to McNamara that one a irplane could be built to do all or mos t of these missions 
and that one airplane could be made suitable for use by both services. However, there 
were three obstacles to prevent the accomplishment of this worthy goal. Firs t, the Navy 
and the Air Force operated from entirely different environments. The Navy airplane would 
have to be launched by catapult from the deck of an aircraft carrier and recovered by 
slamming into the carrier's deck and catching its tailhook on a wire. The Air Force 
aircraft would have to operate from the ground and be subjected to dust and debris not 
found at sea. Secondly, the state of the art was not such to permit the combination of all 
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the desired capabilities into one airframe that anyone could maintain. Third, and perhaps 
most serious, no Secretary of Defense had ever before told the services that they must 
combine everything into one airplane, told them how it was to be used, told them that they 
must all use the same aircraft, and told them just which aircraft manufacturer was going 
to produce it. 
Before it was allover, the TFX issue became complicated by charges of intellectual 
corruption on the part of the analysts in OSD as well as under political manipulation of 
the procedure whereby the contract was awarded to General Dynamics over Boeing. In the 
final analysis, however, the military view was vindicated when it turned out that the 
TFX could not do what OSD and General Dynamics said that it would do and when it cost more 
than twice what OSD said that it would. The Navy found that the TFX (or F-lll as it came 
to be called) was too heavy to land on carrier decks. The Air Force Tactical Air Command 
found that the F-Ill's performance was no match for what was known about Russian fighters 
already in mass production. Ironically, it was the Air Force Strategic Air Command that 
··ras made to take the F-lll as the FB-Ill and put it in the inventory for a role not 
~riginally envisioned by McNamara - as a low-level nuclear bomber. 
If the TFX issue was microcosm of the struggle for supremacy in the Pentagon, then 
its failure was an example of the consequences of ignoring the advice of the professional 
military. There was little solace in the TFX episode for anyone, and if it was a victory 
for the JCS it was clearly Pyrrhic. 
McNamara and the JCS would continue to struggle, but in almost every case the Secre-
tary would be the winner as long as he enjoyed the strong backing of the President. 
"Never before had a Defense Secretary enjoyed such rapport with and unqualified backing 
from the White House. 'I couldn't accomplish anything over here without Presidential 
support,' he had once said. 'It is absolutely fundamental. I wouldn't and couldn't stay 
here one minute without it." 
When White House aides pointed the fing~r at the JCS after the Bay of Pigs, McNamara 
waited a week before he bothered to issue a halfhearted rebuttal. When General Lemnitzer 
pointed out that OSD had not given the JCS time to consider McNamara's directive on how 
developments in space would be pursued, he waS ignored. When McNamara and Admiral 
Anderson clashed, Anderson was sent to Portugal. 
Despite difficulties, disagreements, and almost open warfare between the OSD staff 
and the JCS and service staffs, Mr. McNamara continued to meet with the JCS at almost 
every Monday afternoon meeting. As time went on the discussions became less and the 
silences grew longer until, toward the end of McNamara's reign, Mr. McNamara and the Chiefs 
just sat around the table and looked at each other across a silent chasm that had grown 
too wide for any of them to bridge. 
Mr. McNamara was and is a sincere and dedicated patriot. Much of what he did for the 
Defense Establishment was beneficial, but the reality is that his abrupt managerial methods, 
his lack of understanding the values prized so highly by his military subordinates, and 
his chilling personality prevented him from accomplishing all that he could have, and 
thus many of his changes failed to outlive his own tenure. 
The lack of "understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the 
leaders of theArmed Forces" was manifestly evident from 1961 to 1968. Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson, though different in many ways, shared a certain distrust of the views offered 
~y the JCS. The McNamara secretaryship challenged the military on their home ground and 
placed them on the defensive. 
Unfortunately this serious internal conflict took place at a time when decisions were 
made that pitted the might and prestige of the United States in a new and, in many ways, 
frustrating environment. While the intentions of the men involved were clearly the best, 
the result of the adversorial relationship which developed between the civilian and military 
leaderships of this country (particularly when viewed in light of the Vietnam experience) 
has had a most grievous effect on national security. 
If genuine civil control over the military is the ideal, as most observers suggest, 
then the President and the Congress not only are obliged to define the role of the military, 
but also to protect the role of the military. The military can defend the Nation, but it 
may not be able to defend itself. 
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The military will most likely play whatever role is allotted to it by civil authority 
regardless of how it sees its own role; however, when invited to enter the political arena, 
it becomes difficult for senior military officers to resist the siren call to become 
"soldier-statesmen. " 
There is little in the background of the average American President to prepare him 
for the awesome task of becoming the Nation's grand strategist. The wise President seeks 
the counsel of his military leaders. He is not compelled to accept their advice, but it 
would seem that wisdom would dictate that he at least listen, and, further, wisdom would 
dictate that he insist that the military observe the precepts of their profession and offer 
"purely" military advice. 
The civil-military environment in which the JCS operated during the Kennedy-Johnson 
era was marked by degrees of prejudice, pride, arrogance, and dilettantism. The attitudes 
and actions of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were affected by their prejudices 
regarding the military. The frictions that grew between Secretary McNamara and the Joint 
Chiefs found their roots in the seedbed of McNamara's enormous pride and intellectual 
arrogance. Dilettantism was practiced by all three men. 
In the end it is the President and the Congress who should determine the role of 
force in each situation, but the military can best define the capability of that force 
to achieve the given policy objectives. If it is the duty of the civil authorities not 
to misapply military power, then it is the duty of the military not to overstate the 
capabilities of its forces and to make it abundantly clear in a given situation just what 
the forces can and cannot be expected to accomplish. 
Unfortunately, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw neither the need for, nor 
the virtue of independent, professional military advice on policy matters which were 
fundamentally military in nature. 
There are exceptions to all rules, and there are times when it is better to operate 
outside the proven and traditional parameters; however, improvisation over the long term 
will eventually exact its price and the price in the 1960's might well be called - Vietnam. 
